A response taxonomy and cost model for advanced metering infrastructures by Fawaz, Ahmed
c© 2013 Ahmed Mohamad Fawaz
A RESPONSE TAXONOMY AND COST MODEL FOR ADVANCED METERING
INFRASTRUCTURES
BY
AHMED MOHAMAD FAWAZ
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Professor William H. Sanders
ABSTRACT
The smart grid is creating the potential for security vulnerabilities due to the deployment
of networked devices into the traditional grid. A core component of the smart grid is its
advanced metering infrastructures (AMIs), in which a utility communicates and controls
smart meters at customer sites. The fine-grained control offered by AMIs increases the risk
of cyber-attacks. It is critical to develop cost-sensitive automated response and recovery
strategies, because manual management of security incidents in such a large and complex
system is impractical. This thesis addresses the challenge of enabling automatic responses
to cyber-attacks through two main contributions. First, we introduce and classify an ex-
tended set of AMI-specific cyber-incident response actions. Second, we define a cost model
for response actions. A cost model is an approach for translating security properties into
monetary costs. The cost model is a key element in enabling an automated response en-
gine to make optimal decisions and mitigate cyber incidents. Since AMIs are cyber-physical
systems, the cost model accounts for costs due to both the cyber system and the physi-
cal system. In particular, the cost model estimates the effects of cyber-responses on the
cyber-system and computes the cost due to the loss of cyberservices. The cost model then
estimates the consequences of cyber-responses for the distribution grid. The costs incurred
within the distribution grid are due to outages, disruptions of the electricity market, and
violations of contractual agreements among stakeholders. Finally, we present a realistic im-
plementation of the cost model using ArcGIS for topology generation and GridLAB-D for
grid simulation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The smart grid promises customers faster and more reliable service. It improves reliability
through remote control, quick and automatic detection of blackouts, and accurate state
estimation of the power grid using PMUs. Additionally, the smart grid accommodates more
customer services, such as real-time pricing, and includes provisions for efficient and safe
integration of electrical vehicles. AMIs are a core component of the deployed smart grid.
AMIs are the communication solution for smart meters. Meters in an AMI transmit
real-time meter readings to an administrative network and execute received remote service
commands. Remote commands can turn off service and even control specific appliances
in individual homes; those services are part of demand-response which reduces demand
during peak hours to limit environmental and economic impacts. Outages can be accurately
detected through AMIs, which decreases recovery time, thus improving customer service
and reliability. Moreover, a human meter reader will not be needed, because meters will
frequently send usage data through the AMI. Finally, customers will control smart appliances
over the Internet with the assistance of real-time pricing information.
AMIs introduce significant security issues, since the processing and communication capa-
bilities of AMI devices allow for a larger attack surface. That attack surface includes 1) the
corporate network, 2) the wireless mesh network, 3) the home area network, and 4) meters
that are within the reach of customers. Potential threats can be classified according to at-
tack scale, ranging from relatively small-scale activity designed to target specific customers
(e.g., to turn off service or specific appliances, such as alarm systems) or steal energy (e.g.,
through the alteration of meter readings), up to major organized crimes that could target
extended geographical regions. Moreover, attacks could target the control commands sent
by a utility through the AMI. Additional security issues also arise from the use of wireless
solutions for smart meter communication, in particular through the deployment of large
mesh networks [1, 2, 3].
Compared to traditional IT systems, AMIs have stringent requirements in terms of quality
of service and security guarantees. Those requirements include:
1. Availability: Utility companies should be able to get the latest meter readings and send
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out control commands within specific time constraints. Moreover, customers expect
the latest pricing to be available.
2. Resilience: AMIs provide a critical service to customers. They must be able to work
under extreme conditions and provide the core service of measuring energy consumption
even under attack.
3. Fast recovery: In the event of an attack, a compromise, equipment faults, or even
blackouts, an AMI should allow fast recovery and restoration of service.
4. Size: In the future, a typical AMI could be larger than any conventional CPS ever
built, with millions of nodes in cities; this massive size imposes scalability issues for
traditional security solutions.
5. Privacy: There are also privacy concerns specific to AMIs, since the readings and
commands sent between the meter and the utility company reveal private information
about customers.
Researchers and organizations have made important efforts to promote security solutions
for AMIs, such as VPNs, encryption [4], and remote attestation [5]. Those approaches are
valuable, but they are not sufficient, mainly because vulnerabilities can always be found
in the implementations of protocols and applications, or in human operators who can be
tricked into providing access to restricted resources. Moreover, since meters may not have
sufficient physical protection, tampering with devices may leak secret keys stored in inter-
nal memory and thus could possibly cause security breaches in the network. While recent
efforts have started to investigate the role of AMI intrusion detection (e.g., [6, 7]), security
administrators must manually respond to incidents. We propose to supplement traditional
attack prevention solutions with intrusion tolerance methods such as automatic detection
and mitigation approaches.
Automated response and recovery are of critical importance due to 1) the potentially un-
manageable volume of alerts and demands for decisions in such a large infrastructure, and 2)
the stringent timing and availability requirements of certain power grid functions. In partic-
ular, utilities should be able to get the latest meter readings and send out control commands
according to specific schedules. Additionally, disruption of services, such as outages, should
be detected and addressed with minimum input from human operators. Automatic response
to cyberincidents requires a solution that can process input sent by intrusion detection sys-
tems, assess the security state of the infrastructure, and select the best response action to
mitigate issues in a timely manner.
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Figure 1.1: Proposed RRE components
We propose to implement the response and recovery engine (RRE), an intrusion tolerance
system. RRE determines the security state of the system and detects possible intrusions.
In case of an attack, RRE’s mission is to contain the attack, maintain quality of service,
and recover the system back to a secure state. RRE runs a cost-sensitive response selection
algorithm. That is, it decides on containment levels, and the time to start recovery, based
on the costs of the possible response strategies. Figure 1.1 shows the interactions among
the components of RRE. RRE models AMIs and the business constraints of the utility to
generate a user system model, an attack model, and some safety bounds. The user system
model describes the system resources and services. The attack model specifies all attack
consequences for the system, and the possible response actions for the system. These oﬄine
models, along with a response cost, are used to determine the best possible response to
deploy. Since the selection algorithm is cost-sensitive, the response strategy is dependent
on the accuracy of the cost model. Therefore, it is critical for the cost model to accurately
reflect the financial cost a response to the utility of a response, in order to avoid catastrophic
outcomes.
This thesis explores the concept of automated cyberincident response for AMIs, proposes
a taxonomy of response actions, and designs a cost model for response actions for AMIs.
The different chapters address the challenges of automated response as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides background on security, smart grids, and AMI, and reviews and
discusses existing automated response frameworks and cost models.
• Chapter 3 introduces an extensive set of AMI-specific response actions through a tax-
onomy and the identification of key response characteristics.
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• Chapter 4 introduces a practical cost model workflow that can translate system logs
and cyber-alerts into response costs; provides a solution to generate a dependency
graph from an AMI routing topology; and explores the impact of security attributes
in the context of an attack.
• Chapter 5 evaluates the cost model in an attack scenario and assesses the potential
disruption that a given number of compromised meters could cause.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Cybersecurity is the field that studies the security properties of information and information
systems. Cybersecurity has evolved over time and has been adapted to support the different
uses of information systems, starting from centralized main frames, to the world of ubiquitous
mobile users. Cybersecurity also evolved to accommodate increasing levels of threats and
risks.
On the other hand, the power grid is being outfitted with smart networked devices. Those
devices aim to increase an operator’s awareness of the state of the grid, and the reliability
of the grid itself. However, the introduction of networked devices may put the grid at risk;
cyberattacks targeting the grid could cause outages and even blackouts. Operators should
be assisted in the detection and response process, due to the sheer size and complexity of
the grid, We propose using automated response and recovery systems. Such a system would
detect attacks and suggest cost-sensitive responses to tolerate attacks. Finally, to obtain
accurate predictions, it is necessary to have a cost model. Automated response systems
cannot decide on optimal actions without an accurate and “complete” cost model.
In section 2.1 of this chapter we present the evolution of cybersecurity and lead the way to
the need for intrusion tolerance. We present in section 2.2 the latest work on cost modeling
of response actions. We also present in section 2.3 the necessary background information on
the smart grid and its operation. Finally we detail the design of AMIs in section 2.4.
2.1 Cybersecurity
2.1.1 Traditional Security
“Security is the state of being free from danger or threat” [8]. Traditionally, computer
security has been associated with data security; that is a computing system is “secure” if the
data stored within it are “safe.” As computers have become a primary support of businesses
and industrial processes, the definition has been extended to include the cyberservices being
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operated by the computing systems. Thus, cybersecurity is looked at as the physical security
of machines, the “well-being” of the services running on the machines, and the protection of
stored data.
The situation is well-characterized by the standard rubric to describe security: “cyberse-
curity is the protection of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of data and services
within a cyberspace” [9], where the terms are defined as:
Confidentiality: Preventing disclosure of information to unauthorized entities.
Integrity: Guarding against improper information modification or destruction.
Availability: The property of being accessible and useable upon demand.
Typically, administrators statically identify and deploy security measures that would protect
the CIA properties of resources (data and services) in the system. For example, they would
create access control rules for data access, add redundant servers to ensure availability of a
Web service, and use signed hashes to ensure that data are not tampered with [10]. However,
static methods do not protect systems against attacks that exploit vulnerabilities unknown
to security experts, or against misconfigurations or inside jobs.
2.1.2 Evolution of Security
Cyberattacks typically try to violate the security properties of a system. Security events
usually “result in unauthorized access to, manipulation of, or impairment to the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of an information system or information stored on or transiting
an information system, or unauthorized exfiltration of information stored on or transiting
an information system” [11].
Computer systems are an essential part of industrial processes. Moreover, cyberattacks
have become more potent and easier to perform; the failure of traditional security measures
has turned attacks into a major financial burden for corporations because of losses in produc-
tion, or loss of availability of services (for e-commerce systems). Institutions have become
aware of the risks involved in leaving systems unprotected; thus, it has become imperative
to detect and resolve such security events and minimize their damage.
The first step in the evolution of attack prevention involved looking at the attack surface
of a system. The attack surface is the set of parts of the system that are accessible to an
attacker. The attack surface has three main components: the network, software, and human
attack surfaces. The attack surface of a system carries a set of “intrinsic” vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by an attacker and may not be prevented [12]. Example include:
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Table 2.1: Common Attacker Profiles
Hobbyist Disgruntled Employee Insider Aiding Others
Hacktivist Industrial Espionage Foreign Espionage
Terrorist State-Sponsored Attack
Table 2.2: Generic Threat Matrix [13]
THREAT
LEVEL
THREAT PROFILE
COMMITMENT RESOURCES
INTENSITY STEALTH TIME TECHNICAL
PERSONNEL
KNOWLEDGE
ACCESS
CYBER KINETIC
1 H H Yrs-Decades Hundreds H H H
2 H H Yrs-Decades Tens of Tens M H M
3 H H Months-Yrs Tens of Tens H M M
4 M H Weeks-Months Tens H M M
5 H M Weeks-Months Tens M M M
6 M M Weeks-Months Ones M M L
7 M M Months-Yrs Tens L L L
8 L L Days-Weeks Ones L L L
• Misconfiguration of services communicating with the Internet through open ports
• Zero-day vulnerabilities in the software that implements email, Web, and other services,
or
• A socially engineered employee.
Security administrators use risk and attacker profiles combined with knowledge of their
attack surface to decide on the level of security investment. The decision is heavily based
on the attacker profiles. Table 2.1 shows a list of common attacker profiles. We can imagine
that each type of profile has different goals, points of entry into the system, and resources for
exploiting the system and concealing the attack. For example, a state-sponsored attack has
huge resources, sophisticated capabilities, and specific goals. While a disgruntled employee’s
goals are different from those of a terrorist, the employee has internal access to the network.
The profiles fit into the generic threat table 2.2 proposed by IDART at Sandia National
labs [13]. The different profiles are typically modeled using attack graphs [14]. However,
more expressive models have been proposed [15].
Online detection of intrusions is needed with the increased risk of attacks. Detection
schemes distribute sensors over a system and alert the administrator about possible attacks
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or anomalous behavior. There are two types of intrusion detection systems (IDSs), network
IDSs (NIDS) and host IDSs (HIDS), distinguished by their location and the type of data
they inspect. NIDSs look for packets and flows and are mostly located on routers and
firewalls, while HIDSs are located on individual hosts and servers and monitor system calls
and logs [16, 10]. Several metrics can measure the performance of intrusion detection systems,
such as the false positive rate (FP), false negative rate (FN), true positive rate (TP) and
true negative rate (TN). Those rates relate to the number of correctly diagnosed events and
missed attacks. Ideally, IDS schemes try to reduce the false rates and increase the true rates.
Several detection methods can be used, which have different detection rates.
Misuse detection
In this method, the detection system has a database of attack signatures; an alert is
sent when a match occurs. The problems with this method are that new attacks cannot
be detected, and the system could suffer performance degradation [10]. This method
has a high TP rate, because the signatures are based on expert analysis.
Anomaly-based detection
In this method, the detection system is trained using a “secure” profile of the sys-
tem [16]. The detection system detects any deviant behavior and generates an alert
if, for example, an account is not regularly authenticated from an area. The problems
with anomaly-based detection are a high false-positive rate and the possibility of an
attacker’s poisoning the normal profile by training the detector.
Specification-based detection
In this method, system specifications are studied, and then rules of detection (whitelist
behavior) are set. Any deviation from possible legitimate behavior is considered a
possible intrusion [17]. This method has the problem that not all systems can be
restricted by a set of rules; moreover, it requires expert knowledge to identify rules in
the system.
2.1.3 Defense-in-Depth
Different attackers have different entry points to a system, and as an attack progresses, it
is important to make sure that the internal structure of the system is as protected as the
outer perimeter. For that purpose it is important to implement defenses at all levels in a
computing system. This strategy is referred to as defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth is a
military strategy; it attempts to inflict maximum damage to an attacker by yielding space
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and buying time. In the cyberspace, defense-in-depth is typically implemented by separating
the system into layers with firewalls to control access between those layers [18]. Different
rules protect the layers from unauthorized access. Moreover, defense-in-depth uses IDSs
at the different layers in order to detect intrusions, even if access is controlled because of
vulnerabilities in software and firewalls. Other techniques suggested for defense-in-depth
include antivirus software, NIDS and HIDS, firewalls, encryption, redundancy, isolation, and
moving targets. The critics of defense-in-depth cite the lack of visibility in the network and
the decrease of usability (inconvenience) as problems with such defenses.
2.1.4 The Final Frontier
Defense-in-depth’s countermeasures might not be enough to thwart an attacker. An attacker
could gain access to a network by exploiting vulnerabilities in software and firewalls, or by
social-engineering an employee. Thus, an attacker can go undetected, causing damage or
stealing information. Attacks could cost an organization millions of dollars and cause dis-
ruption of services; thus, it is crucial to build a system that is resilient to attacks. Resilience
of a network requires “the ability of the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level
of service in the face of various faults and challenges to normal operation” [19]. Resiliency in
the cybersecurity space is borrowed from the field of fault-tolerance of computing systems.
Typically, designers use redundancy and diversification of components to increase the relia-
bility of a system. Security could benefit from the same ideas of redundancy. Redundancy,
compounded with diversification of supply chains and programming languages, could lead to
a certain level of attack tolerance. However, diversification is not the silver-bullet solution; it
has a high cost and is not implementable by all systems. Thus, we propose attack tolerance
through a computer-assisted response and recovery system. The assistance system would
help the administrator at several levels:
1. Abstract the security state of the system, thus relieving the administrator from in-
specting low-level alerts and logs;
2. Automatically contain an attack or direct the attacker to a honeypot;
3. Suggest optimal responses to ensure tolerance (replication of services, moving targets,
etc.); and
4. Automatically generate recovery sequences to restore service and reconfigure the system
to avoid future attacks of the same type.
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Automated response and recovery systems have to make decisions after assessing the
security state of the system. Those decisions require predicting the positive and negative
effects of different combinations of attack steps and responses. That element of needing
to predict the behavior of multiple entities explains why game theory has often been used
in implementing automated reasoning systems for security [20]. Other systems have been
proposed by researchers; some use rules to decide on responses [21], while others decide using
a local optimization of the costs of possible responses [22, 23, 24].
2.2 Cost Models
The cost model of response actions is the main driver of automated response systems. The
accuracy of the cost model deeply affects the decisions made by the response system. A
cost model that is not complete or underestimates the real cost might lead to suboptimal
or counterproductive actions. We divide past research on cost models into three categories:
models based on static costs, models based on parameterized costs with static parameters,
and models based on dependency graphs.
2.2.1 Static Cost Models
In the first category, the approaches consist of generating a taxonomy of response actions for
general IT systems and then tagging each action with a static cost value [25, 26, 27, 28, 23, 29].
Those costs have to be assigned by system administrators based on their subjective knowledge
of the system. The issue with that approach is that it does not capture the system dynamics
(i.e., an action that induces changes in a system may affect the costs of subsequent actions).
Moreover, requiring administrators to assign cost values is often impractical, and results in
inaccuracies.
2.2.2 Parameterized Static Cost Models
In the second category [30, 22], the models decompose the cost of actions into several pa-
rameters to better capture how actions may impact the system. Anuar et al. [31] assigned
static costs for each parameter and used an analytical hierarchy process to compute impact
factors. Luo et al. [32] proposed using static costs that would linearly increase over time.
The advantage of these approaches is that the cost model captures more aspects of the actual
cost for the utility. However, use of static parameters still does not capture system dynamics.
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2.2.3 Dependency-based Cost Models
In the third category, Thoth et al. [33] proposed modeling the system using a dependency
graph. The authors dynamically update the availability of the system by propagating in
the graph the impact of nodes’ becoming unavailable due to response actions. That work
was later extended by Jahnke et al. [34] to cover all security properties (CIA) by using
three separate graphs (one for each property). Components dependencies across graphs are
modeled by adding inter-graph edges between the nodes. Finally, Kheir et al. [24] combined
the three graphs into one by labeling the nodes with a vector and used a matrix to model
the relation among the different security properties. The importance of that approach is
that it models system dynamics to capture the effect of an action on the system. However,
the problem is that it still requires considerable effort by system administrators to define
parameter values in the graph. Moreover, the output vector, which represents the total effect
on the CIA properties, requires additional processing to be used by an automated reasoning
system.
2.3 Smart Grid
The power grid in the United States was built during the 1960s. Before then utilities delivered
power in isolated islands. When demand increased, especially during extreme cold, local
islands failed and could not get help from neighboring grids. By the 1960s the islands
had grown, and the decision was made to form three synchronized interconnects (Eastern,
Western, and Texas interconnects). The interconnects brought great advantages, but at the
risk that a single failure in the grid could cascade into a larger blackout. The New York
Blackout of 1965 led to the creation of a utility-managed reliability organization, NERC.
The reliability of the grid increased, but after a series of blackouts culminating in the 2003
Northeast blackout, it became obvious that the grid needed a major upgrade to bring it the
technological advances of the 21st century. Several goals have been set as part of the efforts
to modernize the nation’s electricity transmission and distribution system [35]:
1. Increase the use of modern communication technology for control;
2. Use dynamic optimization for resource allocation;
3. Increase the use of distributed and renewable power sources;
4. Use “smart” appliances in residential settings;
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5. Develop communication standards to ensure interoperability between devices to be
used in the power grid.
Part of the evolution into the smart grid has been the introduction of communication
devices into the power grid, as highlighted in the Energy Independence Act. The Act explic-
itly requires deployment of “smart” technologies and use of digital information and control
for operating the grid. The communication infrastructure is intended to increase visibility
within the power grid in order to provide better situational awareness and more ways to
diagnose and repair faults in the power grid. The smart grid promises higher reliability and
efficiency through faster recovery from outages, more efficient allocation of generation, and
effective use of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar.
2.3.1 Smart Metering
The smart grid promises greater transparency for customers through the use of smart meter-
ing to allow real-time reporting of energy usage and control over power consumption. Smart
meters will be replacing traditional meters for all customers. The meters have communica-
tion capabilities; the communication protocols are specified in ANSI C12.22. The standard
specifies packet structure, addressing, session management, and security modes. The me-
ters are in constant contact with the utility and smart appliances in each household. The
communication with the utility allows the utility to send customers real-time energy pricing
information. On the other side, meters send outage messages to the utilities. Smart grids
have provisions to facilitate efficient charging of electric vehicles, with the goal of charging
them during low-demand times in order to avoid straining the grid. Section 2.4 details the
different architectures for AMIs.
2.3.1.1 Demand-Response
Demand response is a dynamic mechanism that causes changes in customer power usage
in response to price increases, or provides incentives to lower electricity use when market
prices are high or when system reliability is jeopardized. Demand-response has typically
been exercised by manually calling customers during peak days. However, as smart meters
are rolling out, demand-response is being enforced by sending real-time pricing information
to customers; the prices will increase during peak demand and forcing customers to hold
back on power consumption. A second method involves sending load-shedding messages to
customers through the use of smart appliances and protocols such as OpenADR.
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2.3.2 Situational Awareness
“Situational awareness is the ability to know what is happening on the grid and to anticipate
future problems in order to take effective actions” [36]. Situational awareness has multiple
levels, starting from generation and ending at the customers. In today’s power grid, utilities
rely on phone calls from customers and other utilities to detect outages or critical situations.
Through the use of advanced networked sensors, such as smart meters or pole-top devices,
information can flow easily among the different entities that run the power grid.
2.3.2.1 Wide Area Monitoring
The 2003 blackout increased interest in wide-area monitoring, which aims to provide system-
wide snapshots of the state of the grid. Wide-area monitoring allows operators to detect, in
real-time, early signs of system deterioration, starting with deviations from steady-state val-
ues of metrics such as power flows, voltage magnitudes, phase angle difference and frequency,
and rate of change of frequency [37]. Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are currently used
to achieve wide-area monitoring. PMUs use GPS signals to measure the phase difference
between the voltages at different buses. PMUs are networked and their measured values are
concentrated to be used for wide-area situational awareness. PMUs communication protocol
is specified in IEEE C37.118-2. PMUs promise high-quality measurements at an error of
50 µs; however, concerns are being raised at the quality of the currently deployed PMUs,
which are showing duplicates and dropped data.
2.3.3 Transmission Automation
The transmission system carries the bulk electricity from generators to distribution systems.
The transmission system is made up of transmission lines, buses, transformers and other
components that are housed in substations. The smart grid promises more efficient protection
and control scheme for the transmission system. Digital relays are used to protect those
components; relays are used to clear faults, control breakers, etc. Digital relays communicate
over fiber optics to implement advanced coordinate protection schemes; such schemes would
try clearing faults and signaling in advance to other relays about the possibility of a fault.
Moreover, relays provide relatively low cost protection schemes for transformers of different
sizes; such measures increase the lifetime of those components and maintain a record to alert
operators for the need to maintenance.
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Figure 2.1: Complete view of AMI architectures
2.4 AMI Architecture
The goal of AMIs is to support two-way communications among smart meters, smart ap-
pliances, and utilities. Since AMIs can reach huge scales (sometimes more than a million
meters) and have to accommodate a variety of environments (i.e., urban, suburban, and
rural), several architectures have been proposed for deployment of flexible and cost-efficient
communication infrastructure at scale. In this section we enumerate the possible architec-
tures used in AMIs.
2.4.1 Meter Communication
As shown in Figure 2.1, possible options for connecting meters to the utility include two
hierarchical approaches and a direct approach. The two approaches have different advantages
and disadvantages in terms of security, cost, performance and scalability.
2.4.1.1 Hierarchical Approaches
Hierarchical topologies enable the architecture to scale well with an increasing customer
base. In this approach meter traffic is aggregated at several levels before communicating
with the head-end. The goal of those approaches is to avoid managing a large number of
connections of the direct connection approach. Meters are clustered geographically using one
or two aggregation levels to relay communication to and from the utility. Figure 2.1 presents
both aggregation levels by showing that a meter can connect to the meter data management
(MDM) system inside the utility network through either a collector in the neighborhood
area network (NAN) or a second-level neighborhood access point (NAP). A NAP is added
to increase scalability. A variety of technologies can be used to deploy the communication
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links labeled N 1 and A 1 in Figure 2.1:
• Wireless mesh networks allow for dynamic route generation and route healing. This
scheme is the cheapest to implement, and it scales if an optimal placement of collector
nodes is used. It is suitable for residential areas where interference between meters is
minimal. However, it is prone to a wider class of attacks that can cause availability,
integrity, and privacy issues. Examples are physical communication protocols like IEEE
802.15.4 and the proprietary RFLAN [38].
• Power line communication (PLC) carries information on power lines by modulat-
ing messages to a frequency other than 50Hz. This technology does not require new
infrastructure. It is suitable when wireless solutions are not practical, such as in high
rises. However, because of the varying impedance, noise, and high attenuation, use of
the power line as a channel increases the complexity of the modulator at the meter
side [39]. Moreover, since the carrier is the electricity itself, losing a line means losing
both power and communication.
• Wireless Star uses a collector node that directly connects to each meter. Wireless
Star schemes include WiMax or cellular communication that incurs a communication
fee per meter. It is suitable for low-density areas, such as rural areas.
• Private wired networks are run by utilities; in this approach, a utility would deploy a
private network infrastructure (e.g., cable or fiber optic) among meters. This approach
is costly, but provides a higher level of security because of the closed nature of the
network.
Those hierarchical approaches increase the attack surface by adding collectors, relays, and
repeaters to the infrastructure. The attack surface varies depending on the choice of com-
munication technology. For example, wireless communications can be vulnerable to a wide
class of attacks, such as jamming, man-in-the-middle, packet injection, and eavesdropping.
The choice of technology also impacts the set of response actions available. For instance, it
may not be easy to quarantine a node in the case of a wireless mesh network. The clustered
approach decreases the visibility of the network; i.e., traffic could be exchanged between
meters without passing through the head-end. The decreased visibility would require that
extra sensing nodes be placed within the network to detect attacks and failures. Moreover,
clustered approaches suffer from performance degradation because of the extra routing lev-
els, and because of the reliance on failure-prone aggregation nodes. However, the scalability
benefits and reduced costs are valuable enough to justify adoption of this approach especially
in urban areas.
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2.4.1.2 Direct Approach
In this scheme, meters directly communicate with the utility through M 1 [40]. This ap-
proach uses cellular communication (GSM, 3G), WiMax, or leased lines as the communica-
tion technology. Direct communication generally offers the security advantage of removing
an attack vector by making the network hard to access. However, the scheme adds extra
communication cost per meter for the utility and has a scalability issue, especially in dense
areas.
2.4.2 HAN Connectivity
For the purpose of enabling demand-response and load shedding, utilities have to gain de-
tailed measurements and control over some of the customer loads. With the advent of smart
appliances, utilities have the ability to decrease demand for electricity during peak times by
remotely sending price information and even control commands to appliances. Appliances
that are most likely to be remotely controlled are high-power-consuming appliances (electric
cars, washers, dryers, or HVAC). The communication technology for the home area network
(HAN) that connects appliances to the AMI is usually ZigBee. This connectivity brings
significant privacy and security issues, since it could enable an adversary to spy on appliance
usage, or even to disable specific loads such as a security system. To balance the needs of
demand-response applications and privacy and security concerns, several architectures have
been proposed. The meter can be the gateway between the HAN and the utility. With
a Zigbee radio integrated in the meter, it delivers load-shedding commands from the util-
ity [40]. The HAN gateway can also be connected to the utility through a separate WAN [41],
and even use the Internet to receive and send information and commands. The considered
architecture leads to the worst-case attack surface.
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CHAPTER 3
RESPONSE ACTIONS
The first step towards intrusion tolerance in AMIs involves development of a taxonomy of
response actions. The taxonomy suits AMI requirements, such as always preserving the
mission of delivering energy and accurately measuring consumption. The taxonomy allows
us to construct a set of possible response actions by emphasizing the concept of flexibility.
Flexible actions can be tuned to meet a wide variety of requirements and situations. The
taxonomy will then guide the development of a practical case study of ways to design flexible
actions for an AMI.
In this chapter, we present an extensive set of response actions designed to actively mit-
igate cyber-incidents in advanced metering infrastructures. The response actions are im-
plementable for all AMI architectures and technologies, with varying levels of effectiveness.
Our first effort towards defining those actions was to create a generic taxonomy of actions.
Several taxonomies have already been proposed for response actions [29, 25, 42], but most
are not suited for AMIs, as they are meant for traditional IT systems. Those traditional set
of responses usually targeted computer systems with users and file systems, as opposed to
the model within smart meters. Our taxonomy, presented in Figure 3.1, reflects the typical
intrusion response process: collecting information, blocking or limiting attacks, recovering
from attacks, and performing forensics. This taxonomy has been helpful for 1) exploring the
set of possible response actions, and 2) understanding the characteristics of the various ac-
tions that are primordial in the definition of cost models. We used the attack trees presented
in [43] to map the set of actions to attack techniques and ensure a sufficient coverage of the
threat model. The resulting set of actions is presented in Table 3.1.
3.1 Learning Actions
Actions LP1, LP2, LP3, and LA1 (Table 3.1) involve log generation and collection. Those
actions are applicable to all architectures; they involve capture of logs generated by the
smart meters, relays, and head-ends. Most passive actions do not enact new logging actions,
but rely on existing logging mechanisms. LP4–5 are also data-collection learning actions;
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Table 3.1: Organized Set of Response Actions for AMIs
L
ea
rn
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g
P
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si
ve
LP1 Log information
LP2 Generate reports
LP3 Generate alarm
LP4 Profile customers’ power usage
LP5 Passive power bookkeeping
A
ct
iv
e
LA1 Start analysis tools
LA2 Verify ARP caches
LA3 Trace connections
LA4 Enable dormant IDS sensors
LA5 Detect duplicate nodes
LA6 Locate routing attacks
LA7 Request logs
LA8 Add decoy nodes
M
od
if
yi
n
g
B
lo
ck
in
g
MB1 Block meter
MB2 Isolate neighborhood
MB3 Revoke meter keys
MB4 Restart meter
MB5 Block connections
MB6 Limit network access
MB7 Limit system/service access
MB8 Enable quarantine
MB9 Jam attacker
MB10 Change IP addresses
R
ec
ov
er
y
MR1 Roll back previous responses
MR2 Merge neighborhood network
MR3 Distribute attack signature
MR4 Renew keys of meters/utility
MR5 Correct C12.22 routing tables
MR6 Verify meter OS
MR7 Apply patches
MR8 Restart meter
MR9 Replace meter
MR10 Recover meter readings
MR11 Recover service state
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Figure 3.1: Response action taxonomy
however, these collect power measurements as opposed to cyberlogs. They are architecture-
independent.
Active-learning actions are mainly used to deploy new sensors or to change sensor config-
urations in order to collect more activity. Those actions are more efficient when the same
activity is visible to multiple sensors. Thus, they are suitable in the case of a shared medium
(e.g., wireless or PLC) if meters can be used as sensors. Actions LA1, LA2, LA5, and
LA6 are related to verification of routes and detection of routing attacks. If wireless mesh
communications are used, then cooperative behavior is needed to verify routes and detect
routing attacks (e.g., man-in-the-middle, wormhole, and black-hole attacks) [44, 45]. The
responses typically consist of checking routing tables and caches on routers (e.g., cell relays),
and sending probe packets to the mesh to verify that routing paths are correct. For exam-
ple, meters could cooperatively inject multihop traffic in order to verify the integrity of AMI
routes. Action LA4 uses meters or utility trucks to enable more IDS sensors, allowing for
greater visibility of the mesh network. Finally, action LA8 allows for better understanding
of an attacker’s skills and knowledge by adding decoy (honeypot) smart meters.
3.2 Modifying Actions
Modifying actions are mostly architecture- and technology-dependent, because their goal is
to induce changes in the network.
First, blocking actions aim to limit the access and privileges of a compromised entity
in the network. Architectures and communication technologies provide a variety of control
functions and granularities. For example, action MB1, “blocking a meter,” can be performed
by removing the meter from the utility registration list, which is a suitable action for all
architectures but may still allow a compromised meter to attack other devices. In the case
of a hierarchical topology, a more effective response is to update firewall rules at the level of
the collector or the cell relay to block a compromised meter locally. In addition, if a wireless
mesh network is used, quarantine of a meter can be performed through updating of routing
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information of neighboring meters.
Action MB6 includes rate limiting and is applicable to all architectures. The rate-limiting
threshold can vary according to the level at which it is applied in the network topology.
The scope of this action also depends on the granularity of the rate-limiting solution. For
example, if individual flows for a specific device cannot be isolated, rate limiting at the level
of a relay will impact a full neighborhood and will likely affect noncompromised devices. It is
also possible to apply rate limiting at the level of the head-end by delaying packet processing
for compromised meters.
Recovery actions attempt to return the system to a secure state. They deconstruct op-
erations performed by attackers and require a detailed understanding of the AMI security
state. For example, action MR6 checks the integrity of a meter’s operating system. Actions
MR7–8 can then be used to put the meter back into a secure and working state. MR9 would
be used if a recovery is not possible (e.g., the meter has been physically damaged). An im-
portant action is MR1, which enables utilities to reverse the effect of one or several response
actions. If an action is performed based on incorrect information, or if an attacker is able
to take advantage of it, then canceling the action may be necessary. Note that different ac-
tions have different rollback levels, ranging from fully reversible (e.g., adding decoy nodes),
to irreversible but with removable effects (e.g., blocking a connection), to fully irreversible
(e.g., alerting an intruder).
3.3 Response Action Tags
As mentioned in the previous sections, different responses have different intensity levels,
different granularities based on the AMI’s architecture, and varying rollback capabilities.
Those characteristics are used by the cost model when computing the cost of the response,
and are used by the response engine when determining if the response is applicable to a
certain AMI technology. We tag the different responses with the following characteristics to
help us understand cost parameters and to guide the response engine.
1. Rollback level : This is an important characteristic to take into consideration when cal-
culating a cost model for each action, since irreversible actions are likely more expensive
for utilities than reversible actions are.
2. Applicability to specific architectures and communication technologies: For example,
the response “merge neighborhood network” (MR2) is applicable only for AMIs that
use a clustered architecture.
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3. System-level involvement : Some actions (such as logging actions (LP1), restarting of
meters (MB4), or revocation of keys (MB3)) can be performed locally by a single
device; others (including actions that verify routing entries (LA6) or isolate meters
(MB1)) require multiple devices to cooperate on a wider scale.
4. Flexibility : some actions’ intensity can be set. For example, the rate-limiting (MB6)
threshold can be tuned dynamically.
5. The system layer impacted : Layers include the physical, network, and application
layers. It is important to set the layer in order to help with the implementation of the
response and determine the privileges it needs.
6. Manual involvement : Ranges from none (fully automated action) to some (input re-
quired from an operator). This characteristic is critical if an action can have potentially
unsafe effects.
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CHAPTER 4
COST MODEL
In this chapter we present the cost model for AMI response actions. The cost model fuses
the physical state of the distribution grid with the cyberstate of the AMI to compute the
financial burden of a response action. We present the method for estimating the cyberstate
using dependency graphs that are optimized for AMI services. The cyberstate is the average
level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) for the AMI services. Finally, we
present a method to convert the cyberstate to a financial cost by estimating the consequences
of the losses on the power grid.
4.1 Response Cost Model
When accidental failures or malicious events occur, operators of large infrastructures such
as AMIs have to take critical decisions in order to recover the system and keep it operating.
A diverse set of sensors provides multiple feeds of input raw data that should be converted
into information that a human operator can comprehend. The objective of a cost model is to
perform that conversion task. At a high level, a cost model takes static input, such as system
configurations and system topologies, and dynamic input, such as live feeds of alerts and
system logs. The model identifies the cyberphysical state and computes the financial impact
due to system changes. System changes include failures, attacks, and security responses.
We are particularly interested in the responses; how do we automatically provide quantified
decision-making support to operators who are responding to cybersecurity events?
A survey of the literature indicates that availability of services is used as a main metric in
computing costs for traditional IT systems. For example, e-commerce systems require high
availability to maintain business, and loss of availability is proportional to loss of revenue.
However, an AMI is a large cyberphysical system in which the cost of an action is linked to
the power grid. Using availability as the cost metric does not represent the actual cost for
a utility. Thus we need to quantify the cost due to the cyber system and the interactions
between the cyber system and the physical system. This is achieved by our cyberstate
conversion process. Additionally, customers play an important role in the system, since they
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are directly affected by outages, price updates, and energy delivery services. As a result,
we propose a cost model that goes beyond service availability and considers three entities:
utilities, customers, and attackers.
When a response action is taken it changes the system state; the notion of response cost
can be divided into an operational cost (required to perform the action) and an impact cost
(as a result of the action). Indeed, any action requires a preparation phase and leads to a
consequence phase, and costs can be estimated for both of those phases. Mathematically,
the cost of an action is computed with:
CAction(I) = COperation(I) + CImpact(I) (4.1)
where COperation covers the cost of labor to initiate and run the action, and CImpact is the
cost of the impact of the action on the system. The evaluation of those costs requires
an accurate prediction of the system’s behavior through an in-depth understanding of the
internal dynamics. To gain predictive capabilities, one needs to design a dependency model
from which state changes of a set of components can be precisely trickled down to other
components.
Figure 4.1 presents a high-level framework that describes the dataflows used to compute
the total response cost. An important feature of an AMI is that it combines a power in-
frastructure and a communication infrastructure. We assume that the configuration and
topology for both of those infrastructures are static and provided to the model. We generate
a dependency graph using the AMI network topology. We use the system logs and IDS
sensor alerts to update the intrinsic state of the dependency graph. Using the dependency
graph, we compute the security state of the system in terms of impacts on confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA) of the different services. We then simulate possible failures
in the power grid using the security posture of the cybercomponents. We used a power
simulation, GridLAB-D, to compute outage metrics. Finally, we convert the impact on CIA
and the magnitude of outages into financial values. Those are presented to an operator or
to an automated response system as a response cost.
4.2 Dependency Graph Generation
Our cost model uses a dependency graph of an AMI to evaluate the effect of a response action
on the security properties of services in an AMI. The dependency graph is designed to model
any system. The dependency graph, G = (P,E), models the dependency relations between
the different components C and services S in a system, where P = C ∪ S. The edges in the
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the proposed cost model workflow
graph E model the dependency relation between the components and services. Each studied
system has its own set of services and components. Moreover, the relationship between
the services and components relates to the system configuration. These relations can be
practically modeled by inspecting, protocol specifications, routing information, firewall rules,
log files and other traces that can show the dependency relationship between components
and services. We define the general method for generating the dependency graphs and also
specify the method for creating them for AMIs.
4.2.1 Services
Services in a system are implemented via processes running on hosts. For example in a
traditional IT system, those processes could be HTTP services, Kerberos, or an encryption
service. Those processes offer the service over the network to other hosts or users. Generally,
it is the responsibility of the system administrator to choose the services in a system.
In our case study of an AMI, we consider the following services: a meter-reading service, a
real-time pricing information service, and a remote commands service, S = {Smr,Spi,Src}.
Figure 4.2 shows a sample dependency graph containing the meter-reading service. More
end-to-end services are performed in an AMI, but we focus on the listed subset in S, as they
provide a major portion of AMI traffic.
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4.2.2 Components
Components are elements of the system that enable a service to function. Components can
be divided into 4 classes: data sources, data sinks, cipher elements, and routing elements.
The identification of the components of each service defines the dependency relationship in
the graph.
In our AMI case study, the components, C, are the meters, C12.19 table entries, C12.22
messages/links, and head-end components used by each service. Specifically, all services in
an AMI can be defined as reads and writes to the C12.19 tables and message flows of C12.22
messages. However, different data entries have different semantics. We differentiate among
the table entries and define them as separate components in the dependency graph, as shown
in Figure 4.2.
• Meter-reading service in an AMI generates metering data due to usage, stores the
data in C12.19 table entry Dmmr, and sends it to the head-end using C12.22 messages.
The data are stored at the head-end’s database Dhemr.
• Real-time pricing service in an AMI writes real-time pricing information received
from the head-end’s database Dhepi through C12.22 messages to the C12.19 table entry
Dmpi .
• Remote commands service in an AMI writes special values in the C12.19 table
entry Dmdr, when specific C12.22 write messages are received from the head-end. That
launches special functions that control appliances and turns services on and off re-
motely.
Finally, some services use the cipher components for encryption and authentication. The
basic building components of those operations are keys, ciphers, and hash functions. In our
AMI study case, the cipher operations are defined in the C12.22 standard security mech-
anism [46]. Standard C12.22 security uses the EAX mode for authentication and protects
the privacy of the message using a shared key. Our dependency graph models the security
mode through the keys Ki and cipher EKi(m). The keys Ki are specific to each meter and
are shared with the head-end. The head-end has the following high-level components: 1)
a database Dhei , which stores the data for each service; 2) meter keys Ki’s; 3) a utility key
(pk, sk); and 4) an encryption-decryption engine EDeng, which performs the cipher.
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Figure 4.2: Sample dependency graph of an AMI for meter reading service Smr
4.2.3 Graph Generation
The dependency relation D = P ×P defines the transitive relation between the components
and services in G. That is, (a, b) ∈ D means “a needs b.” (a, b) ∈ D is defined as an edge
(a, b) ∈ E. We use the routing information, the information flow, and the abstracted service
definition discussed in section 4.2.2 to generate those relations. Starting from each service,
the graph is generated by tracing the messages from the hosts to the users. For example,
in an AMI, a message originates at the head-end, is sent to a meter Ml through a WAN
connection to the collector (CRk), and then is routed using a mesh. The message is verified
through use of the key and the cipher DKl(m) and written to the C12.19 table entry. Thus, a
service in an AMI depends on the state of the wireless channel that transmitted the message,
the set of meters that relayed the message, the different components in the originating meter,
and the state of the head-end.
We start with the set of routes R in the system, that is, Mi ! CRj
WAN
−−−→ Head − end.
We create the routing graph, which represents the backbone of our dependency graph. Then
we attach our services and components to the respective hosts. The last step is to connect
the dependent services and components. Each meter node contains the services in S and
the dependent C12.22/C12.19 entities we identified. Figure 4.2 shows a sample dependency
graph in an AMI.
Each node in the graph is tagged with a vector V [C, I, A] ∈ [0, 1]3 that represents the
current security level of the node in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, with
0 being the least secure state and 1 being the most secure state. The index is interpreted as
the current link capacity in the case of availability. For example, if 50% of traffic is dropped
through a link, then Vlink[A] = 0.5. However, confidentiality and integrity are binary, with
1 for the secure state and 0 representing the insecure state.
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4.2.4 Weight Matrix
Each edge in G is tagged with a function F, F : [0, 1]3 → [0, 1]3. The function is a mapping
between the security properties (C,I,A) of a component and its dependent. That is, F defines
the effects of a compromise of any of the security properties of a component on its dependent
node in G. We implement the function F as a 3× 3 weight dependency matrix W, shown in
matrix 4.2.
W =


wC,C wC,I wC,A
wI,C wI,I wI,A
wA,C wA,I wA,A

 (4.2)
wC,I represents the effect that confidentiality of a component has on the integrity of its
dependent node. The weight matrix can be defined for the components we defined in sec-
tion 4.2.2.
4.2.4.1 Data Components
If the CIA of stored data is affected, then the respective security property of the dependent
component is lost. For example, if meter-reading data Dmr is not available, then the billing
service Smr for the meter is not available. The weight matrix is a diagonal matrix with 1’s
on the diagonal and 0’s elsewhere.
4.2.4.2 Cipher Components
The loss of confidentiality of a key leads to loss of confidentiality of the message, and loss of
integrity since the message can be resigned with the compromised key. Loss of confidentiality
of a key does not lead however to loss of availability for the dependents. If the integrity of a
key is compromised, then the service is using a mismatching key for the security mechanisms.
Thus, availability and confidentiality are lost for the end-services. If A is compromised, then
C is compromised either because data are sent unencrypted, or because the data are not
being pushed through. Those relationships are shown in matrix 4.3.
WK〉 =


1 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1

 (4.3)
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Require: EventSet← Logs ∪ Alerts
Require: G = (A,E)
1: for all event in EventSet do
2: Vintrinsic[CIA]← Result(event)
3: end for
Figure 4.3: Algorithm initialization
4.2.4.3 Communication Components
The security state of the communication link has a direct effect on the message passing
through it. That is, if the link loses availability, the service loses availability; this also holds
for confidentiality and integrity. The weight matrix is thus a simple diagonal matrix.
4.3 Security State Computation
The cost model uses the dependency graph to compute the consequences of a response on
system dynamics. The model computes a vector VSi [CIA], which is the security vector of all
services in an AMI. Figure 4.3 shows the initialization algorithm. This algorithm requires the
set of alerts and logs collected in an AMI. The alerts are mapped to the dependency graph
through updating of the intrinsic security vector of all nodes. If an action is a block action,
then we have to set the availability of the affected parties. The second step is to propagate
the new vector values and compute the per-service security indices, as shown in Figure 4.4.
The propagation process starts with a service Si and finds the dependencies of the services
from the meter to the head-end. The algorithm then loops over all sets of (D′, E,D), which
represents the set of neighbors in the graph. The pair of connected nodes are updated using
the update set in line (4). Then, we compute the V [CIA] for Si by using equation 4.4.
V [C] = min
i∈depends
Vi[C] (4.4)
If a dependent component of a service Si loses confidentiality or integrity, then the service
loses that property. The same argument applies to availability, because the link with the
smallest availability acts as the bottleneck in the path. Finally, we compute the total V [CIA]
for each service in the AMI in line (9) as the mean of V [CIA]. By computing the mean we
are computing the fraction of meters that lost confidentiality, integrity and availability for
each service.
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Require: G = (A,E)
Require: R← Response Action
1: for all Si in ServiceSet(A) do
2: DependencyPath← DependencySet(Si)
3: for all (D′, E,D) in DependencyPath do
4: VD = W[E]× VD′
5: end for
6: VSi [.]← minD∈DependencySet(Si){VD[.]}
7: end for
8: for all S in ServiceSet do
9: V [CIA]← 1
N
∑
i VSi[CIA]
10: end for
Figure 4.4: Update algorithm
4.4 CIA Conversion
The third step of the dependency analysis is to convert the security vector V [CIA] into the
financial cost incurred by a utility, as described in section 4.1. The cost breakdown for loss
of security in the AMI services is highlighted in Table 4.1. The conversion method accounts
for the possible consequences of the responses by modeling the effects of an attack on the
power grid without explicitly enumerating the possible attack steps. For example, the table
shows that the costs of loss of integrity and availability of pricing information and remote
commands is due to outages caused by a malicious increase in power demand. The other
factors we are considering are due to energy theft (electricity market) and Service Level
Agreements (SLAs).
Table 4.1: Attack/Response Action Cost Breakdown
Integrity Availability Confidentiality
Real-time pricing Outages No Cost
Remote Commands Outages SLA
Privacy Cost
Meter Readings Electricity Market SLA
4.4.1 Meter-Reading Compromise
Compromising the integrity of meter-reading data could result in receipt of inaccurate me-
tering data by a utility. The meter data are used to bill the customer for power usage; thus,
any inaccuracies mean that either the customer is being overcharged, or the utility is losing
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revenue. Energy theft is the case of meter data reflecting a value less than the actual one
causing revenue loss for the utility. The cost for the utility is shown in equation 4.5.
Cmr = ∆T × estimatedUsageDiff × $/kWh× VSmr [I] (4.5)
∆T is the duration of the period in which the response is enabled, and $/kWh is the cost
of power during that period per kWh per unit of time. EstimatedUsageDiff, computed in
equation 4.6, estimates the value of the power taken during the theft.
estimatedUsageDiff = γ ×maxUsage (4.6)
The value models the aggressiveness of the attack; that is, the more severe the attack the more
usage is to be expected. The term γ is an index that reflects the attacker’s aggressiveness.
Other methods could be used to estimate the amount of energy theft possible; however, such
techniques are computationally intensive and would make online use of for the cost model.
If the meter readings lost availability, then the utility would miss a ∆T amount of readings.
Such a compromise would not lead to a cost for either the utility or the customer, since the
data are already stored within the meter and can be transmitted after the AMI is restored
to a secure state. However, an SLA penalty would be set because of the unavailability of the
service.
4.4.2 Real-time Pricing Information Compromise
Pricing information in an AMI are used for real-time billing. The price is sent to the meter
and the customer will pay for the energy used based on that price. In case the pricing
information is unavailable, then we assume that the customer is billed based on a flat rate.
The utility loses revenue if the flat rate is less than the current price of energy, because the
utility is covering the difference in cost. In case the flat rate is more than the actual rate,
then the customer is overpaying for energy. The cost conversion algorithm estimates the
usage of customers using historic data to compute the revenue loss for the utility.
Cpi = ∆T × historicUsage ×∆$/kWh (4.7)
If the integrity of pricing information is breached, then we risk a sudden increase in demand
as the low prices drive demand. More details on the cost of power demand increase are
presented in the next section. Pricing information is public, so there are no concerns about
privacy compromise.
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4.4.3 Remote Commands Compromise
Service commands remotely control customer service and appliances. This service enables
demand-response, which controls prices by varying demand during critical times. The loss
of integrity of remote commands allows an adversary to arbitrarily increase power demand
in the power grid. The demand increase has two cost repercussions for a utility if the
new demand is a significant fraction of the total demand on the transmission grid. The
first direct cost is the fact that the increase of demand will require the utility to purchase
generation power at a high cost. The indirect cost is incurred by local outages due to severe
and persistent demand hikes. Outages are caused when components of the distribution grid
(such as transformers, fuses, lines and capacitor banks) are overloaded for long periods of
time. Modeling of the distribution grid and the wholesale market is used to predict the
costs in the case of the increased demand. The value of increased demand is found using
equation 4.8.
Demand = γ ×maxPower × V [I] (4.8)
γ is the same parameter as in 4.6; it models the effect of the attack. It can be set to depend
on the criticality of the location or on the level of pessimism the utility is exercising. Outages
require that trucks be rolled out and repair damage. They also cause losses for customers,
the cost for customers is highlighted in [47] based on an empirical study.
4.4.4 Cost of Privacy
V [C] is the fraction of private usage data that is compromised. Several papers propose
methods for identification of loads that use usage data. Thus, revealing of usage information
through loss of confidentiality leads to an invasion of customer privacy. Although it is not
easy to put a price on privacy, we have the following suggestion:
• The Californian smart grid law requires utilities to protect usage information. A
penalty, similar to NERC CIP violation penalties, could involve a penalty per day
per customer for compromised data.
• Recurring privacy compromises might lead customer’s to lose confidence and change
service providers.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDY
In this chapter we discuss the implementation details for the cost model and provide a case
study.
5.1 Implementation Details
We now complement the previous chapter by providing lower-level details about the imple-
mentation. We start with the details of the dependency graph implementation. We then
specify the method for injecting the responses and computing the security vector Vi[CIA].
Finally, we convert the security vector to the financial cost incurred by the utility due to the
distribution grid.
The response action cost model is designed to run continuously as part of the response
engine decision algorithm. The response engine works in an online fashion to help decide
on a suitable response during a security incident. As mentioned previously, the model has
two phases when computing the cost of a response, updating the security vectors of the
dependency model and then simulating the power grid to compute the physical costs.
5.1.1 Dependency Graph
In a practical deployment setting, the dependency graph is generated from a grid topology
and a network routing configuration. We wrote a script that takes geographic information
system (GIS) data as the sole input and automatically infers an AMI deployment configu-
ration. To test the script implementation, we obtained GIS data from the publicly available
parcel tax data of a small town (with a population of 7,282 inhabitants in 2011). We assumed
a single meter per parcel, and we located a number of cell relays to cover the GIS region.
Using ArcGIS’s Python extension, we generated the topology of the deployment. Then the
cell relays (CRs) were added to the network to cover the deployed meters allowing 3,000
meters per relay. Using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm, routes between the meters were
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formed to allow each meter to reach the closest CR in the area. Optimal routing can be used
to generate the routes since most of the AMI routing algorithms reviewed generally tend
to generate optimal routes. Finally, the dependency graph is generated using the algorithm
specified in section 4.2. All security vectors are initialized to the secure state of the network,
that is Vi = [1, 1, 1], where i represents indices of nodes in the system.
5.1.1.1 Performance Evaluation
We implemented the dependency graph using a data structure called adjacency list to store
the state of the different node in the system. Each meter node has 8 components including
3 services, 4 data objects, and 1 cryptographic key, and is tagged with a security vector that
holds three floating values (for confidentiality, integrity, and availability). As a result, the
memory footprint of the graph is 2N×(3 services+4 data+1 key+1 meter)×(20 textbytes),
where N is the number of meters in the AMI, and the 20 bytes represent the size of the
security vector and the overhead due to the graph. The second part of the dependency
graph implementation is the update algorithm. The algorithm in Figure 4.4 has a worst
complexity O(|P ||E|); however, the update algorithm is optimized for the AMI study case.
The algorithm updates the security vector per service by traversing the path from the service
to the head-end. Since in an AMI the average length of a path is relatively small, the
algorithm has an average complexity of O(|P |).
5.1.2 Execution Model
The proposed cost model starts with updating the security state of the system by updating
the dependency graph. The update changes the security vectors for affected nodes in the
system, and then the new values are propagated throughout the dependency graph. A re-
sponse R has to be injected into the dependency graph in order to be evaluated; section 5.1.3
explains the process of injecting a response. After the response has been injected, the update
algorithm is run again in order to update the security vectors in the graph. Finally, we have
to convert the new values into the financial values using the process described in section 4.4.
Implementation details on the financial conversion process due to the power demand in the
grid are discussed in section 5.1.4.
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5.1.3 Response Injection
The taxonomy of response actions described in Chapter 3 tagged the responses with several
parameters. The tags are used to compute the cost of an action. The parameters include
response scale, meters involved, and time at which the action is applied. Since an action
induces changes in the dependency graph, the security vector V [CIA] gets updated based
on the type of action and the expected effects on the system.
The response action taxonomy has two kinds of actions, learning actions and modifying
actions. Learning actions do not change the topology of the network; instead they add traffic
to the network in order to gain more information about an event. When a learning action
is injected, the availability of a meter or a link is affected because of the traffic needed to
get the data. On the other hand, modifying actions can either block or limit an attack, or
recover from an insecure state. A limiting response action that blocks a set of meters results
in voiding of the availability of the meters, so V [A] = 0. Reboot actions cause unavailability
for the duration of the reboot process. Recovery actions generally reset the security vector V
to [1, 1, 1]. However, some actions, such as flashing a new firmware or verification of routes
and meters, temporarily cause reduction in availability.
The last step in the communication-side implementation is to update the security vectors.
The update algorithm computes the new security vectors in the network. We then convert
the CIA indices to the financial cost based on the expected consequences of the action and
the actual cost of implementing the action.
5.1.4 Grid Simulation
Parts of the conversion process require predictions of outage frequency and duration. An
outage is assumed to be caused by prolonged overloading of parts of the distribution grid.
Localized outages require the utility to dispatch crews to repair and restore service, thus
inducing cost to the utility. GridLAB-D [48] id used to simulate the grid while the power
demand of residential loads is being increased. GridLAB-D is an open-source, agent-based
distribution grid simulator developed and maintained by PNNL. The simulator models the
topology of the grid including feeders, transformers, capacitor banks, loads and protection
devices (reclosers, sectionizer, and fuses). We feed the new security vectors to the GridLAB-
D application, which determines the amount of extra demand of power that might occur
because of injected response actions. That models the notion of consequences enabled by
the action after an attacker executes a particular attack.
The GridLAB-D reliability module models faults in the grid that result from short-circuit
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faults such as Single-Line-Ground and Line-Line faults. GridLAB-D allows the user to set
the target, timing, and frequency of the fault. However, it does not model faults due to
overloading lines in the grid. After trying to increase the power demand we noticed that
GridLAB-D notes the overload but does not model faults because of this state. For this
purpose of actually injecting faults, we added the demand into loads and record the lines
with power flow over the rated level. Then, we inject the faults that would be caused by
the sagging of lines, destroyed fuses, or damaged transformers. GridLAB-D simulates the
faults and reports outage frequency and sizes and some relevant reliability metrics through
the reliability module. The cost for a utility to fix the fault is then estimated using an
assumption about the an average cost to repair an outage, SAIDI × repairCost(t), where
SAIDI stands for the system average interruption duration index, which shows the average
duration of a sustained interruption for a customer during the reporting period. Another
important metric used by utility and given as an output in our simulation is the average
service availability index (ASAI), which shows the fraction of time that a customer has
received power during the reporting period.
5.1.4.1 Performance Evaluation
Our current GridLAB-D simulations are running on a MacBook Pro, with Core i7 2.4 GHz
processor and 8 GB of memory; Table 5.1 shows the time it takes to complete a simulation.
GridLAB-D uses a single thread to run the simulations. Since several responses are expected
to be evaluated and compared during a decision, it is important to compute costs as fast as
possible. We note that the results from Table 5.1 could be improved, since work has been
done in [49] to accelerate the Gauss-Seidel power flow solver using FPGAs. The authors of
the paper achieved 48x-62x speed-up for power flow computation for 200,000 bus system.
Table 5.1: Measured Execution Times of GridLAB-D [49]
# Bus Execution Time (sec)
10,000 2.62
20,000 5.34
50,000 15.32
100,000 32.83
200,000 67.64
As part of the future work, we will be looking to optimize the performance of the sim-
ulation. The initial idea is to simulate a large scale power demand situations that can be
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stored in a lookup table. The table will define the outage metrics for different values based
on power demand and expected demand due to an attack.
5.2 Case Study
In this section, we show how the cost model works in a case study. First, we investigate the
level of power consumption needed to drive the grid to a critical state. Then, we use the
parameters computed in the first step to study the costs of responding to an attack scenario
that compromises the demand-response mechanism in an AMI.
5.2.1 Demand Increase
We simulated the IEEE 37-node test feeder [50] and varied the power consumption of loads
in the topology. The simulation verified that the concern that the power supply could be
disrupted by an increase in demand is realistic. Moreover, the simulation found the minimum
γ to be used in the cost model. We assumed that all loads in the topology were residential
loads. Typical residential loads reflect a set of common house appliances that are capable
of generating 40 kW of demand. Table 5.2 shows the ratings of some common high-power-
demanding appliances. Assuming that demand-response systems typically control heavy
loads in order to curtail demand during high demand periods. The maximum possible power
injection due to the 37 residential loads is Pmax = 1.5 MW. We simulated the surge of
Table 5.2: Typical Power Consumption in a Household [51]
Appliance Rating
Oven 12 kW
AC 9.2 kW
Heaters 9 kW
Water Boiler 5.5 kW
Dryer 5 kW
Total 40.7 kW
demand by increasing residential demand by γ × 40 kW. Figure 5.1 shows the current level
with varying power demand. We measured the fraction of current feeder to current rating
in the main feeder as the demand increased. The results show that it is possible to drive the
grid to a critical state with a minimum value of γ = 0.6.
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Figure 5.1: Current level with varying power demand
5.2.2 AMI Scenario
We wanted to showcase our cost model for response actions using an AMI under attack. We
defined an AMI deployment with the assumptions given in section 4.2. The AMI serves 37
customers, and the meters were placed according to the method suggested in section 5.1. We
considered a specific attack scenario and defined two different response actions that would
block the attack and recover to a secure state. The cost model computed the cost of the
responses using the parameters shown in Table 5.3. Historic usage profiles and price forecasts
were used to estimate the flat and peak demand rates, and SLAs were in place to penalize
for loss of availability of some AMI services. Finally, the customers were connected to the
grid through the IEEE 37-node test feeder topology.
5.2.2.1 Attack Scenario
The attack scenario assumed that a vulnerability in the meters made it possible to replay
demand-response commands. The attacker controlled appliances by replaying previously
issued commands. The intensity of the attack, the parameter γ, modeled the extent of
the adversary’s ability to sniff and store messages to be replayed, which is identical to the
maximum damage the attacker can inflict.
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Table 5.3: Case Study Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Node location GIS Repair cost $100/hr
Total nodes 36 Tpatch 1 day
Pmax 1.5 MW ∆T 5 hrs
γ 0.6 Power surge 3 kWh
Ttrans 18.5 sec Flat rate $4
SLA DR $3,000/hr Peak power cost $4.50
SLA MR $500/hr Failure rate 2× 10−5
5.2.2.2 Response Actions
The system allows for two possible response actions. The first response, R1, is to re-key the
meters in order to invalidate the packets stored by the attacker. The meters are frequently
re-keyed at a rate of ∆T , until a patched firmware is sent to all meters. Meters are re-keyed
because the attacker will store the new set of messages to use to restore the attack. Then,
after Tpatch, the meters are patched and the re-keying stops. The second response, R2, re-keys
all the meters for one time, then blocks the remote commands service. Then, after Tpatch, the
meters are patched and service is restored. The first response does not completely block the
remote control service, but instead allows the remote service to run while it changes the AMI
keys periodically. The response also risks the possibility of replaying some demand-response
messages between the re-keying periods. The other response does not allow for the risk of
replaying demand-response messages, but it completely blocks the remote commands service
until a firmware fix is available.
5.2.2.3 Response Cost
The cost of R1 is shown in equation 5.1. The re-keying process generates new meter keys
at the head-end, and then sends them to the meters. The periodic key change causes a
short temporary unavailability of all services during the roll-out time. After the meters
have been re-keyed, the attacker can reinitiate the attack and thus cause an outage in the
grid. The first part of the equation reflects the cost of loss of availability of real-time pricing
information due to the re-keying process, shown in equation 4.7. The second part of the
equation (SLA(All)) is the SLA penalty due to loss of availability of the AMI service. The
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last part of the cost is one due to possible outages, as explained in section 5.1.4.
C(R1) = (N × 3 kWh× 0.5$/kWh+ SLA(All)).
Tpatch
Ttrans
+ SAIDI(γ).∆T.repairCost (5.1)
The cost of R2 is shown in equation 5.2. The cost reflects the SLA penalty due to the
unavailability of the remote control service of the AMI.
C(R2) = SLA(Src)× Tpatch (5.2)
5.2.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we compute the actual costs of the response actions R1 and R2 using the
parameters in Table 5.3. We first find SAIDI by injecting faults in the grid and use the result
to compute the costs.
5.2.3.1 Fault Injection
We vary the failure rate of injected faults in our simulated grid and compute the different
reliability metrics. The increasing rate models the effect of increasing demand in the grid.
The results in Figure 5.2 show SAIDI as a function of the failure rate. The number of outages
increases as the failure rate increases over a period of a day. The results also show that at a
failure rate of 2× 10−5 SAIDI was about 6.
5.2.3.2 Numerical Results
In those parameters, the SLA penalty for blocking the remote service is high, which is
expected because the remote service provides demand-response, which offers major cost
relief to the utility. The parameter repairCost is also relatively high, because it includes
labor hours and rolling of trucks. The time needed to roll out the keys during the re-keying
process is estimated as Ttrans = N × 500 ms.
First, we computed the SAIDI due to R1. Since γ = 0.6, which represents the first value
of demand when the grid is in a critical state, we increased the failure rate to find the lowest
failure rate at which the distribution grid begins to show sustainable outages. The study
showed that at a failure rate of 2× 10−5, the SAIDI was about 6.
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Figure 5.2: SAIDI as failure rate varies
The cost of R1 is $3, 000, while the computed cost of R2 is $72, 000. Even though R1
has SLA penalties for all services, the penalties are applied for a small period of time that
the actual cost diminishes. If ∆T is longer, then the cost to repair outages could have been
higher than the SLA penalty for the remote commands service. As a result, based on the
value of the parameters the system recommends to apply R1 in case of an attack against
the demand-response system.
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CHAPTER 6
TCIPG DEMO
For the 2012 TCIPG Annual Industry Workshop [52], we prepared a demo of a comprehensive
intrusion-tolerance suite. The demo implemented a preliminary version of a game-theoretic
response and recovery engine (RRE) [20]; RRE is a cost-sensitive intrusion response system,
and we implemented our AMI-specific response cost model as part of RRE’s decision algo-
rithm. RRE uses a specification-based IDS [53] for AMI. Finally, the demo was implemented
over TCIPG’s Itron smart-metering testbed. The IDS uses logs and C12.22 packets gener-
ated by the testbed to generate alerts. RRE uses the alerts to assess the security state of
the system and to find optimal cost-sensitive responses.
6.1 AMI Testbed Topology
Our AMI deployment for TCIPG uses 24 Itron OpenWay smart meters and three cell relays;
the AMI topology is shown in Figure 6.1. The meters are capable of wireless communication
using RFLAN, a proprietary 900 MHz wireless communication protocol designed by Itron.
The cell relays are C12.22 routers’ which route traffic between the meters and the head-end.
Itron’s cell relays are equipped with multiple communication ports, such as an RFLAN, a 3G
modem, a WiFi access point, and an Ethernet port. The meters form a self-healing wireless
mesh network that optimally connects to the nearest cell relay. The cell relay connects the
meters and the head-end, as discussed in Section 2.4; the meters communicate with the relay
using the RFLAN port and the relay communicates with the head-end using the Ethernet
port. We distributed the meters over three floors in the Coordinated Science Laboratory, on
the campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The meters automatically
formed a mesh networks on each of the three floors. Each mesh network formed a NAN
and connected to a cell relay. The cell relays in our setup connect to the head-end using
an Ethernet switch. The head-end is a host that runs several Itron OpenWay collection
engine processes; these include Itron’s control panel, Itron’s C12.22 services, and an Oracle
database for storage. Itron’s control panel is a Web-based front end that allows control of
the AMI configuration.
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Figure 6.1: Topology of AMI deployed in CSL
We also placed four separate IDS sensor nodes (AMIlyzer) in each NAN. AMIlyzer imple-
ments the specification-based IDS, is installed over a beagleboard running Ubuntu. Traffic
from each NAN is mirrored using a span port to the beagleboard to be analyzed by the
AMIlyzer. AMIlyzer monitors the traffic and detects anomalous behavior as defined in a
specification. Alerts generated by AMIlyzer are broadcast and captured by OSSIM, an
event manager. We installed RRE on a virtual machine; RRE acquires alerts from OSSIM
and continuously assesses the security state of our AMI and computes optimal responses.
Finally, we implemented a front-end, to be used by an administrator, which shows a
representation of the system model, and prints possible malicious events and response actions
to be deployed to stop an attack and restore the system. Our current implementation assumes
that the administrator is in the loop and has to approve all responses.
6.2 Threat Scenario
The demo showcases the detection and response systems that we added to the testbed. First,
we preloaded a simplified Attack-Response Tree [20] (ART) to RRE, shown in Figure 6.2.
An ART is an extended attack tree that tags each attack step with a set of countermeasures
and allows for computation of the probabilistic state of the system using the uncertainties
of IDS alerts. An abstract attack goal is the root of the ART. The root goal is achievable
through a set of concrete subconsequences. The consequences are connected to parent nodes
through AND/OR gates. The logic gates define the precondition Boolean expression needed
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to enable higher-level attack consequences. Finally, the lowest-level attack consequences are
tagged with a set of observations that are needed to confirm its occurrence. The observations
can be IDS alerts, alerts from anti-viruses, or logs. When an observation is captured, the
attack consequence is turned into a True. The state of the system is updated through
propagation of the changes via the Boolean relations encoded in the ART. Finally, when
a countermeasure is enabled, the subtree rooted at the respective attack consequence is
set to False. However, as we noted in Section 2.1, IDSes are not accurate; thus, the state
computed by updating of the binary state of the tree is not accurate. In order to deal with
uncertainties, the observations are tagged with uncertainties; a naive Bayes binary classifier
uses those uncertainties to compute the probability that the attack has occurred, and thus
computes a belief state vector.
We designed our scenario’s ART with a service loss as the highest-level attack goal. Service
loss can be achieved by 1) injecting disconnect C12.22 packets into the AMI network, or 2)
injecting a disconnect job using the AMI Web services. The two possible subconsequences
are connected with an OR gate, which means that only one attack consequence is needed
to disable service in a meter. Finally, it is possible to inject Web service jobs by connecting
to the Web service and sending a C12.22 job. All the low-level attack steps are tagged with
observations {Event12,Event13, IDSEvent1}; those are the events we expect from AMIlyzer
and the firewall logs. In particular:
• Event12: Obtained from any AMIlyzer node
• Event13: Obtained from the firewall logs at the collection engine
• IDSEvent1: Obtained from any AMIlyzer node
The consequences are also tagged with possible countermeasures, such as blocking C12.22
traffic, if the injection of C12.22 is achieved. As for the unauthorized Web services job
injection consequence, we can either block the offender IP, or disable all remote control
services. The following is a set of the possible responses:
• Block all Webservices (R1)
• Block unauthorized user (R2)
• Block all meters (R3)
• Reconnect meter (R4)
We implemented responses R1 and R3 using shell scripts that control firewall rules at the
collection engine. In effect, we block all incoming traffic to the port used by the Itron Web
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Figure 6.2: Simplified ART for TCIPG demo
services. We implement response R2 by changing some data entries that manage users in
the AMI in the Itron database. WE implemented response R4 using a remote script that
invokes a Web service that schedules a reconnect job at the collection engine.
6.3 Demo Execution
In our scenario, the attacker, an insider, 1) connects to the Itron Web services and 2) issues
an unauthorized meter disconnect order. The combination of the two steps results in the
high-level goal of disconnecting service for a customer. We implemented that using a simple
C# program that connects to the Web services on the collection engine and calls a meter
disconnect function while providing:
• The target meter Electronic Serial Number (ESN)
• Employee login credentials
After the attacker runs the attack script, a C12.22 disconnect message is sent to the target
meter. The targeted meter disconnects service for the customer. However, the attack is
detected, since it violates the specifications set for AMIlyzer. Thus, an alert is generated
stating that an unauthorized, even if valid, disconnect was detected. The alert is captured
and stored by OSSIM and pushed to RRE. RRE receives the firewall logs from the collection
engine, which reports theWeb services logins that occurred when the meter was disconnected.
RRE updates the security state of the system and infers that an attack has been detected.
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Table 6.1: Costs of Responses
Response Pair Cost
R1 and R4 37.39
R3 and R4 52.76
Figure 6.3: RRE front-end showing a set of responses to recover from attack
The response engine in RRE computes the cost of the possible responses and displays the
choices to the administrator, as shown in Figure 6.3. The costs of the response pairs as
computed by our cost model are shown in Table 6.1. The goal of having an administrator in
the loop is to avoid catastrophic outcomes due to RRE. The administrator has to confirm
the proposed action by RRE. In our demo, the optimal responses were found to be R2 and
R4, where R2 blocks the user from accessing the Web services, and R4 restores service for
the customer.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
This thesis presented an approach to understanding the role of automated responses for
AMIs. We introduced a set of cyber-incident response actions that are suitable for AMIs.
The definition of those actions followed a rigorous process that included a review of the
possible AMI architectures and communication technologies, the definition of a response
taxonomy, and the identification of key response characteristics.
We then proceeded to define a comprehensive approach for cost modeling of response ac-
tions. The cost model takes into account the cyber-physical nature of an AMI by integrating
system dynamics to capture the potentially significant consequences for the power grid. The
approach accounts for cost due to the operation of the action as well as the cost of the
action’s consequences for the system. We proposed an extended dependency graph that can
be used to model any system, and we used it to model an AMI. We then defined methods to
convert a response’s impact on an AMI to a financial cost to the utility. The methods mainly
account for losses due to changes in the physical system, in the form of outages and price
fluctuations. Finally, we proposed using a simulator, GridLAB-D, to predict outages in the
grid due to power demand increases. The main contribution of this work is that it requires a
minimum of subjective input from the utility, as it uses the costs due to the physical grid to
specify the importance of services, instead of requiring an administrator to set such a critical
parameter manually.
Finally, we implemented the actual automated response system for AMIs on the TCIPG
AMI testbed, which contains a hybrid network of real and emulated meters.
7.2 Future Work
We intend to completely automate the process of generating the cost equations using business
objectives and costs. Moreover, we plan to implement a robust reliability model for the grid
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that accounts for failures due to demand increases. We are also working on improving the
practicality of the cost model. Moreover, we plan to use the cost model as a component in
a response and recovery engine.
The long-term goal of this research is to build a new response and recovery engine. The
engine we plan to build should be scalable, distributed, resilient to attacks and sensor uncer-
tainties, cost-sensitive, modular and adaptive. The goal of the response and recovery engine
is to provide tactical and strategic responses based on different threat models and risks.
This work will use concepts from control theory, swarm intelligence, machine learning, and
game theory. We also plan to devise a similar evaluation framework for intrusion-resilience
mechanisms. The goal of the framework is to gain a mature level of evaluation similar to
that already achieved in the fault tolerance performance evaluation field.
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